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Madison v. Riter
474 F.3d 118 (4th Cir. 2006)
FACTS
Ira W. Madison is an inmate held in custody at a Virginia state
correctional facility.' Madison is a Hebrew Israelite and belongs to the
Temple Beth El, whose members are required to eat a kosher diet and
celebrate Passover. In July 2000 and again in March 2001, he notified
Virginia correctional officials that his religious beliefs required him to eat
this kosher diet or a "Common Fare" diet.3 Although local officials granted
these requests, Central Classifications Services (CCS), an agency of the
Virginia Department of Corrections (VDOC), overturned these approvals.4
CCS believed the current menus provided to Madison offered him sufficient
food alternatives.5 CCS also questioned the sincerity of Madison's religious
beliefs and considered his history of disciplinary problems in coming to its
6decision. In August 2001, Madison brought suit against the Commonwealth
of Virginia and various VDOC officials, claiming, inter alia, that these
denials of kosher meals violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (RLUIPA). 7
Virginia argued that RLUIPA was unconstitutional because it not
only violated the Establishment Clause,8 but also exceeded Congress'
authority under both the Spending Clause9 and Commerce Clause.'0 The
federal district court held that RLUIPA violated the Establishment Clause
and dismissed Madison's RLUIPA claims. 1 This court reversed, and
remanded the case back to the district court for consideration of Virginia's






7 Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-2000cc-5 (2000);
Madison, 474 F.3d at 123.
8 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
9 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
10 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Madison, 474 F.3d at 123.
1 See Madison v. Riter, 240 F. Supp. 2d 566, 570 (W.D. Va. 2003) (stating that RLUIPA is a
clear violation of the Establishment Clause because it has the primary effect of advancing religion above
other fundamental rights), rev'd, 355 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1103 (2005).
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other constitutional arguments. 12  On remand, the district court found
RLUIPA did not exceed Congress' authority under the Spending Clause, and
thus declined to address the Commerce Clause argument.' 3 The district court
also ruled that because Virginia had accepted federal funds, it had also
waived its sovereign immunity with regard to RLUIPA damages claims.
14
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b),1 5 the district court certified its rulings on
RLUIPA's constitutionality for interlocutory appeal.16  Virginia requested
such an appeal, and this court granted its request for interlocutory review.
1 7
Virginia also appeals the ruling that it waived its sovereign immunity against
damages claims under the collateral order doctrine.18
HOLDING
Writing for a three-judge panel of the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals, Circuit Judge Wilkinson held that RLUIPA is a valid exercise of
Congress' power under the Spending Clause, and because Virginia
voluntarily accepted federal funds, it must also abide by RLUIPA's
requirements. 19 The court found that because RLUIPA unambiguously
conditions federal funds on a State's consent to suit, Virginia had waived its
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.2° However, the court held that
because this condition does not unequivocally state that it applies to money
damages, the Eleventh Amendment bars Madison's damages claims against
the State.2 '
12 See Madison v. Riter, 355 F.3d 310, 313 (4th Cir. 2003) (stating Congress can accommodate
religion in section 3 of RLUIPA without violating the Establishment Clause), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1103
(2005).
13 See Madison v. Riter, 411 F. Supp. 2d 645, 648 (W.D. Va. 2006) (finding that Congress
properly exercised its spending power in section 3 of RLUIPA).
14 Id. at 656.
15 See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2000) (stating when a district judge feels that his order involves a
controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an
immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he
shall so state in writing in such order).
16 Madison, 474 F.3d at 123.
17 Id.
18 Id. (citing Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 147
(1993)).
19 Id. at 122.
20 Id. at 133.
21 Id. at 133.
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ANALYSIS
Section 3 of RLUIPA prohibits the government from imposing a
substantial burden on the religious exercise of a prisoner unless the
government demonstrates that this burden furthers a compelling
governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering that
interest. 22 This provision applies whenever a substantial burden is imposed
in a program that receives federal funding.23 The term "program" includes an
agency such as the VDOC that receives federal funding assistance.24
Virginia first disputes the district court's holding that RLUIPA does
not exceed Congress' Spending Clause authority.25 This court stated that the
Spending Clause is a permissible method for Congress to use to encourage
states to meet federal policy choices because the states still have the choice
to conform to such policies.26 Congress' Spending Clause authority has been
restricted by the Supreme Court.27  In South Dakota v. Dole, the Court
established several requirements that must be met: (1) the spending power
must be exercised for the general welfare; (2) the conditions must be
unambiguous; (3) the conditions must be related to the purpose of the federal
spending; (4) the conditions must not be otherwise unconstitutional; and (5)
the financial inducement offered by Congress must not be coercive in
nature.29
The court addressed each of these Dole restrictions and upheld the
district court's holding that RLUIPA is a valid exercise of Congress'
22 Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-(a) (2000).
23 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-l(b)(1) (2000).
24 Madison, 474 F.3d at 124.
2 Id.
26 Id. (citing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168 (1992)).
27 Id.
28 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). The Supreme Court considered the issue of
federalism and Congressional power under the Taxing and Spending Clause. In 1984, Congress passed
legislation withholding a certain percentage of federal highway funds from states that did not adopt a
minimum drinking age of twenty-one-years-old. Id. at 205. South Dakota allowed nineteen-year-olds to
purchase beer containing up to 3.2% alcohol and sued to challenge the federal statute. Id. The Supreme
Court held that Congress had engaged in a valid exercise of its power under the Taxing and Spending
clause. Id. at 203. Congress' spending is subject to four restrictions: first, it must promote "general
welfare;" it must be unambiguous; it should relate to the federal interest in particular national projects;
and other constitutional provisions may supersede conditional grants. Id. at 207-08. However, the Court
held that the statute was not an attempt to induce states to engage in activities that would be
unconstitutional, and thus, the Twenty-first Amendment does not bar conditional grant of funds so as to
invalidate the statute. Id. at 210. The highway funds were merely a pressure on the state to comply, not a
compulsion to do so. Id. at 204.
29 Madison, 474 F.3d at 124.
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spending power. First, the court looked to see if RLUIPA promotes the
general welfare. The court had "no trouble" in concluding that RLUIPA tries
to protect prisoners' religious beliefs and also promotes their rehabilitation
and thus falls within Congress' pursuit of the general welfare.3°
Second, the court determined whether the RLUIPA conditions are
stated unambiguously. It cited the clear statement rule which declares that
when Congress looks to alter the usual constitutional balance between the
federal government and the states, it must make its desire to do so
unmistakably clear in the statute's language.3' In order to determine whether
RLUIPA's conditions apply to the states, they must furnish clear notice
regarding the liability at issue.32 The court found that the language of
Section 3 of RLUIPA does indeed provide clear notice of RLUIPA's
religious liberty protections.33 There also is clear notice that these conditions
apply to state entities that accept federal funds.34 The court thus concluded
there was nothing unfair about holding Virginia to its obligations as
established by RLUIPA.35
Third, the court decided whether the RLUIPA conditions on federal
grants are related to the purpose of the federal spending. The court found
that this requirement was met because these conditions are triggered only
where a state agrees to accept federal funding for institutions such as prisons,
and not when it accepts funding for unrelated matters such as education.36
Virginia had two arguments that the court quickly shot down. It first argued
that there is no federal interest in the operation of state prisons.37 The court
cited numerous Circuit opinions that found that prisoner rehabilitation and
religious liberty protections are legitimate interests related to federal funding
of state prisons.38 Moreover, RLUIPA's religious liberty protections help to
further the process of rehabilitating the prisoner. 39 Virginia also argued that
while Congress may specifically appropriate federal funds, it may not impose
30 Id. at 125 (citing Charles v. Verhagen, 348 F.3d 601, 607 (7th Cir. 2003)).
31 Id. (citing Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989)).
32 Id. (citing Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 126 S.Ct. 2455, 2459 (2006)).
33 Id. (citing Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-l(a)(1)
(2000)).
34 Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-l(a)(2)(A) (2000)). See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(4)(A)
(2000) (stating that the statutory definition of government includes state agencies).
35 Id.
36 Madison, 474 F.3d at 126.
37 Id.
38 id. (citing Cutter v. Wilkinson, 423 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir. 2005); Benning v. Georgia, 391
F.3d 1299, 1308 (11 th Cir. 2004); Charles v. Verhagen, 348 F.3d 601, 608 (7th Cir. 2003); Mayweathers
v. Newland, 314 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2002)).
39 See Cutter, 423 F.3d at 587 (stating that RLUIPA's religious protections not only are related to
the federal interest in prisoner rehabilitation, but also are an important part of that process).
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general, program-wide restrictions. 40  The court stated that the Spending
Clause has never required Congress to impose conditions on a grant-by-grant
basis.41 It also mentioned that it had recently rejected a similar Spending
Clause challenge to a condition of the Age Discrimination Act42 even though
it applies on a program-wide basis.43
Fourth, the court determined whether another constitutional
provision bars RLUIPA's conditions on federal funds. Virginia argued that
RLUIPA's religious liberty protections are unconstitutional because
Congress is prohibited from imposing RLUIPA's requirements on the States
directly.44 The court responded by stating that objectives that Congress may
not attain through its Article I powers may nonetheless be achieved through
the use of its spending power and the conditional grant of federal funds.45
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine only proposes that the Spending
Clause cannot be used to induce the states to engage in unconstitutional
activities.46 The court found that RLUIPA does not induce the States to
engage in unconstitutional activities and thus meets the fourth Dole
requirement.47
Virginia apparently tried to avoid this precedent by arguing that the
Supreme Court in Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights,
Inc.48 changed the judiciary's view of the Spending Clause.49  This court
referred to an explanation it gave in an earlier opinion where it discussed
James Madison's and Alexander Hamilton's opposing views of the Spending
40 Madison, 474 F.3d at 126.
41 Id. (citing Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 129 n.1 (1947)).
42 Age Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6101 (2000).
43 Id. (citing Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 493-94
(4th Cir. 2005)).
44 Id.
45 Madison, 474 F.3d at 126 (citing South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987)).
46 Id. at 127 (citing Dole, 483 U.S. at 210).
47 Id.
48 Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 126 S.Ct.1297 (2006). The
Supreme Court considered the issue of the constitutionality of the Solomon Amendment. The Solomon
Amendment requires a law school and its university to offer military recruiters the same access to its
campus and students that it offers to nonmilitary recruiters in order to receive federal funding. Id. at 1304.
An association of law schools and law professors sued, alleging the Solomon Amendment infringed their
First Amendment freedoms of speech and association. Id. at 1302. the Supreme Court held that the
Solomon Amendment did not place an unconstitutional condition on the receipt of federal funds, nor did it
violate the law schools' freedom of speech or association. Id. at 1297. It found that because the First
Amendment would not prevent Congress from directly imposing the Solomon Amendment's access
requirement, it doesn't place an unconstitutional condition on the receipt of federal funds. Id. at 1307. It
follows then that Congress could impose this condition indirectly through the Spending Clause. Id.
49 Madison, 474 F.3d at 127.
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Clause.50  Whereas Hamilton took a broad view of the Spending Clause,
Madison understood it to give Congress no additional power.5' Virginia
argued that Rumsfeld adopted Madison's view that the Framers intended to
limit the scope of the spending power to those powers otherwise stated in the
52Constitution. The court, however, found fault in this argument. It
mentioned first that Rumsfeld rejected, not upheld a Spending Clause
challenge. 3  Moreover, the Supreme Court not only failed to adopt
Madison's view, but further confirmed Hamilton's view, stating that the
spending power is arguably greater than Congress' power to achieve its goals
directly.54
Virginia finally argued that RLUIPA is unconstitutional because it
requires the states to provide prisoners religious accommodations that aren't
required by the Constitution.55 The court rejected this argument by stating
that Congress is not prohibited from exceeding the Constitution's reach when
placing conditions on federal funds.56 It cited to the statute held valid in
Dole, which required the states to adopt a minimum drinking age of 21, an
age limit not to be found in the Constitution's language.57
Finally, the court determined whether RLUIPA's conditions on
federal funding are coercive in nature. The court stated that the coercion
analysis looks to distinguish between choices that are truly voluntary and
those that are illusory, passing the point where pressure becomes
compulsion. 58 Although RLUIPA conditions 100% of federal funding for
state institutions on compliance with it, the VDOC received only 1.3% of its
funding from the federal government in 2005. 59 The court found that this left
Virginia with a real choice to accept the federal funding and attached
conditions.60 The court, however, cautioned that anytime a Spending Clause
statute conditioned all of the funding on state compliance with its
requirements, coercion concerns would be raised.6' But where, as here,
50 Id. (citing Litman v. George Mason Univ., 186 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 1999)).
51 See Litman, 186 F.3d at 556 & n* (stating that while Hamilton believed that the term "general
welfare" as used in the Spending Clause embraced a vast variety of particulars, which are susceptible
neither of specification nor of definition, Madison believed it to vest Congress with no additional
authority).
52 Madison, 474 F.3d at 127.
53 Id.
54 Id. (citing Rumsfeld, 126 S.Ct. at 1306).
55 Id.
56 Madison, 474 F.3d at 127 (citing Dole, 483 U.S. at 205).
57 Id.





Congress has offered merely mild encouragement to the States to comply
with the statute, the choice to accept or reject federal funding remains strictly
62with the states. Virginia simply was not coerced into taking this funding,
and in fact, never argued it needed the federal funding to operate its
prisons.63
In sum, the court concluded that addressing Virginia's Spending
Clause challenge was a straightforward process. Congress has a legitimate
interest in how federal funds are spent, and a legitimate interest in protecting
the religious freedoms of those who are institutionalized. 64 Congress has
made it clear that funding will only be received if RLUIPA's requirements
are met.65 Finally, states are free to reject funds that amount to only a tiny
fraction of their entire budgets.66 Virginia has mainly argued that it has the
sovereign authority to operate its state prisons and establish religious policies
within its borders so long as they don't violate the Constitution.67 However,
state sovereignty may be waived in the pursuit of other objectives, such as
obtaining federal funding.68 Virginia has essentially made the untenable
argument that state sovereignty is unwaivable, and that the federal
government must continue to provide funding even without a waiver.69 In
conclusion, to acknowledge Virginia's argument and uphold the Spending
Clause challenge would be an "extraordinary assertion of judicial
authority. 
70
Virginia next disputes the district court's holding that it knowingly
consented to and waived immunity against damages claims against the state.
The court discussed how the Eleventh Amendment restricts Article 1I
judicial authority, and also that Article I cannot be used to avoid the
constitutional limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction.71  A dual
sovereignty arrangement exists between the states and federal government,
so that each has the ability to control each other and also itself.72 Entrenched
in this is the principle that a private party may not file suit against an
62 Id. (citing Dole, 483 U.S. at 211).
63 Id.
64 Id.





70 Id. at 129.
71 Id. (citing Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72-73 (1996)).
72 Id. (citing United States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring)). See also The Federalist No. 51, at 291 (James Madison) (stating that the different
governments will control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself).
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unconsenting state.73 However, a state may waive this immunity by
voluntarily participating in a federal spending program so long as Congress
has made it clear that this participation is conditioned on the state's consent
to waive its constitutional immunity.74 General participation in such a
program is not enough to waive immunity; 75 rather, the waiver must be
unequivocally expressed in the language of the statute.76
The court looked at the text of RLUIPA in order to determine
whether Virginia had waived its immunity. First, it decided whether it
waived its immunity against claims for equitable relief. Section 4(a) of
RLUIPA states that any person may assert a violation of this chapter as a
claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against
a government.77 RLUIPA's definition of "government" includes states and
their agencies and departments.78 Therefore, the court found that on its face,
RLUIPA creates a private cause of action against the state.79  The court
concluded that because the term "appropriate relief' ordinarily includes
injunctive and declaratory relief, Madison's claims for equitable relief are
not barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
80
The court then determined whether Virginia had also waived its
immunity against monetary damages awards. It stated that Congress may
condition funds upon a waiver of immunity against liability without waiving
a state's immunity from monetary damages. 8' In order to sustain a claim that
a state is also liable for monetary damages awards, the waiver of sovereign
immunity must extend unambiguously to such monetary claims.82 It cited
United States v. Nordic Viii., Inc.,83 where the Supreme Court held that
73 Id. (citing Fed. Maritime Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 767-68 (2002)).
74 Id. (citing Litman v. George Mason Univ., 186 F.3d 544, 550 (4th Cir. 1999)).
75 Id. at 130 (citing Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 246-47 (1985)).
76 Id. (citing Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996)).
'n Id. (citing Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(a)
(2000)).
78 Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5 (2000)).
79 Id.
so Id. at 130-31 (citing Shea v. County of Rockland, 810 F.2d 27, 29 (2d Cir. 1987)).
81 Id. at 131 (citing Lane, 518 U.S. at 196).
82 Id. (citing Lane, 518 U.S. at 192).
83 United States v. Nordic Viii., Inc., 503 U.S. 30 (1992). The Supreme Court considered the
issue of whether section 106(c) of the Bankruptcy Code waives the sovereignty immunity of the United
States from an action seeking monetary recovery in bankruptcy. Section 106(c) provides that
notwithstanding any assertion of sovereign immunity, a provision of this title that contains 'creditor,'
Ientity,' or 'governmental unit' applies to governmental units; and a determination by the court of an issue
arising under such a provision binds governmental units. Id. at 32. The Supreme Court held that section
106(c) does not waive federal sovereign immunity from an action seeking monetary recovery in
bankruptcy. Id. at 39. It stated that section 106(c) fails to establish unambiguously that the waiver
extends to monetary claims, as it can be interpreted in at least two ways that preclude monetary relief
from being awarded. Id. at 34.
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section 106(c) of the Bankruptcy Code did not waive federal sovereign
immunity for monetary relief. 4 This was because section 106(c) did not
include the "unequivocal textual waiver" required to waive immunity for
monetary relief.85 Based on this case, the court concluded that RLUIPA's
language lacked the unequivocal textual waiver required to waive state
immunity from monetary damages awards.8 6 First, RLUIPA does not
expressly refer to monetary relief.87 Moreover, its reference to "appropriate
relief' can be interpreted in different ways, either to include or preclude
monetary damages awards.88 The D.C. Circuit recently held that the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act's (RFRA)89 identical "appropriate relief'
provision was insufficient to waive federal sovereign immunity against
damages awards, stating it wasn't the unequivocal waiver required by
precedent. 90 Because it found this language to be ambiguous, such language
was not enough to result in a waiver of sovereign immunity.91 This court
concluded that Congress could have easily effected a waiver of sovereign
immunity against damages awards simply by placing unambiguous language
in the statute containing an unequivocal textual waiver of immunity against
these awards.92
Madison argued that even if RLUIPA does not have the required
unequivocal textual waiver, the Civil Rights Remedies Equalization Act of
1986 (CRREA)93 does.94 The statute provides:
A State shall not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment from suit
in Federal court for a violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973, title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, the Age
Discrimination Act of 1975, title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, or
the provisions of any other Federal statute prohibiting discrimination
by recipients of Federal financial assistance. 9




88 Id. at 131-32 (citing Webman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 441 F.3d 1022, 1026 (D.C. Cir.
2006)).
9 Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2000).
90 Webman, 441 F.3d at 1026.
91 Id.
92 Madison, 474 F.3d at 132.
93 Civil Rights Remedies Equalization Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 (2000).
94 Madison, 474 F.3d at 132.
95 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(l) (2000).
499
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The court stated that although the CRREA unambiguously conditions the
receipt of federal funds on a State's waiver of sovereign immunity, and
although this waiver sometimes applies to damages awards, the CRREA does
not clearly apply to RLUIPA; in fact, it makes no mention of RLUIPA
whatsoever.
96
Madison nevertheless claimed that the catch-all provision of
CRREA, "any other Federal statute prohibiting discrimination," includes
RLUIPA and thereby waives sovereign immunity in this case.97 The court
again rejected this part of the argument, stating the catch-all provision does
not serve as an unequivocal textual waiver.98 It mentioned that all of the
statutes listed in CRREA all expressly prohibit discrimination.99
Based on interpretative canons of noscitur a sociis, and ejusdem
generic, the court declared that where general words follow specific words in
a statute, the general words are construed to embrace only objects similar in
nature to those objects mentioned specifically. | °° So, in order for CRREA's
catch-all provision to apply to RLUIPA, RLUIPA must be like the statutes
expressly listed.' 01 The court found, however, that RLUIPA is not a statute
aimed at discrimination, but rather aimed at forbidding substantial and
unjustified religious burdens on prisoners. 102 RLUIPA also differs from the
non-discrimination statutes mentioned in CRREA, which require identical
treatment of similarly situated persons, because it requires states to
accommodate religious requests more favorably than non-religious
requests. °3  The court concluded that the catch-all provision was too
ambiguous to constitute an unequivocal textual waiver against damages
awards. 104
CONCLUSION
The Fourth Circuit's recognition that the protection of prisoners'
religious liberties helps to facilitate their rehabilitation reflects an increasing
viewpoint that the exercise of religious beliefs plays a major role in
improving prisoners' state of minds and behavior. This has been seen in




100 Id. at 133 (citing Wash. State Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Guardianship Estate of
Keffeler, 537 U.S. 371, 384 (2003)).
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Madison, 474 F.3d at 133.
104 Id.
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both the legislative and judicial branches, as well as realized by society in
general. Congress first attempted to protect the religious liberties of
prisoners by enacting RFRA in 1993. After the Supreme Court held RFRA
could not be enforced against the states in 1997,105 Congress did not stay
quiet, but instead tried again. As Senator Kennedy stated before Congress
during a discussion of RLUIPA, the "bill is an important step in protecting
religious liberty in America. Sincere faith and worship can be an
indispensable part of rehabilitation, and these protections should be an
important part of that process., 10 6  Thereafter, RLUIPA was enacted,
showing Congress' continued pursuit of protecting the religious liberties of
prisoners.
The Fourth Circuit is now the fifth circuit to hold that RLUIPA does
not violate the Spending Clause, and the sixth circuit to state that protecting
prisoners' religious liberties aids their rehabilitation. In 1969, the D.C.
Circuit mentioned that allowing prisoners to practice religion furthers their
rehabilitation. 10 7 In 2002, the Ninth Circuit first concluded that the federal
government has a strong interest in monitoring the treatment of federal
inmates housed in state prisons and in contributing to their rehabilitation.,
0 8
Congress may allocate federal funds freely, then, to protect the free exercise
of religion and to promote rehabilitation.' °9 In 2003, the Seventh Circuit
stated that religion can play an important role in the process of rehabilitating
prisoners.110 In 2004, the Eleventh Circuit declared that both the protection
of the religious exercise of prisoners and their rehabilitation are rational
goals of Congress, and that those goals are related to the use of federal funds
for state prisons."' The last circuit to comment on this before the Fourth
Circuit was the Sixth Circuit in 2005, which stated that a prison's compliance
with RLUIPA satisfies one of the statute's main purposes, which is to allow
inmates greater freedom of religion in order to promote their
rehabilitation." 2 This uniformity amongst the circuits respects Congress'
intention to rehabilitate prisoners through the use of religion, and also means
105 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532-36 (1997) (ruling that the religious protections
required by RFRA exceeded Congress' remedial power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
106 146 CONG. REC. S6678, 6689 (daily ed. July 13, 2000) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
107 See Barnett v. Rodgers, 410 F.2d 995, 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (stating that religion in prison
subserves the rehabilitative function by providing an area within which the inmate can reclaim his dignity
and reassert his individuality).
108 Mayweathers v. Newland, 314 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2002).
109 Id.
110 Charles v. Verhagen, 348 F.3d 601, 608 (7th Cir. 2003).
I Benning v. Georgia, 391 F.3d 1299, 1308 (11 th Cir. 2004).
112 Cutter v. Wilkinson, 423 F.3d 579, 587 (6th Cir. 2005).
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that the Supreme Court is likely not needed to rule on RLUIPA's
constitutionality with relation to the Spending Clause.
Legal scholars and society at large also now understand the
importance of religion in rehabilitating prisoners. In 1993, a prison in New
York announced it would start offering Kosher meals to Jewish prisoners
beginning with the Jewish New Year. 1 3  The prison tried to encourage
religious activities, believing it would rehabilitate the prisoners.' 14  The
assistant commissioner of correction at the time, the Reverend Earl Moore,
stated, "[iun a state of incarceration, you don't have many hope pegs to hang
your being on. Religion is one of those hope pegs."'1 5 An inmate who had
been convicted of drug possession stated that the kosher meals would have
"both spiritual and physical benefits."'1 6  Another example of religion at
work has occurred at a California prison formerly ravaged by numerous gang
attacks. Beginning in 2003, inmates began participating in a religious
program based on a book, The Purpose Driven Life, by the Reverend Rick
Warren. 17 The first 200 inmates finished the program in April 2003, and
violent incidents inside the prison in the year since have decreased across the
board as compared with such incidents over the previous year.' 8 Prison
spokesman Lt. Kenny Calhoun stated that the religious program "has
definitely played a role" in this decrease. 19
Legal minds have also commented on the utility of religion in the
prison context. Jamie Forman, a partner at Bedell & Forman LLP in New
York, has opined that spiritual development and religious study are perhaps
the most valuable tools for rehabilitation and to prevent recidivism.
20
Matthew P. Blischak has written that permitting prisoners to practice their
religion arguably would provide significant benefits to the prison system and
society. Jim Thomas and Barbara Zaitzow, professors of sociology and
criminal justice respectively, have written that religion functions similar to





117 Don Thompson, Officials: Prison Program Answer to Our Prayers, MIAMI HERALD, May 13,
2004, at 7.
118 See id. (stating that during the previous year, there were five riots, 103 violent incidents, four
staff assaults, 1,226 inmate disciplinary reports and five lockdowns, and in the year since, there was one
riot, 67 violent incidents, four staff assaults, 1,067 inmate disciplinary reports and one lockdown).
119 Id.
120 Jamie Aron Forman, Jewish Prisoners and Their First Amendment Right to a Kosher Meal: An
Examination of the Relationship between Prison Dietary Policy and Correctional Goals, 65 BROOK. L.
REv. 477, 484 (1999).
121 Matthew P. Blischak, O'Lone v. Shabazz: The State of Prisoners' Religious Free Exercise
Rights, 37 AM. U. L. REv. 453,484 (1988).
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gang affiliation and the need to connect to other people. 122  Like gangs,
religious affiliation can provide safety, access to otherwise unobtainable
resources, contact with others (including the opposite sex) in a relatively safe
environment, and a sense of social solidarity and higher purpose.123 If so, the
availability of religious programming would be expected to reduce the
likelihood of gang affiliation. 124 Finally, Harry R. Dammer, a professor of
sociology and criminal justice, has noted that many prisoners achieve a peace
of mind from religious observance, something which helps them survive
psychologically while imprisoned.
25
There have been a number of studies conducted which have found
positive results of incorporating religious activity into prison life. In one
study conducted in 2003, a faith-based prisoner reform program was
evaluated. 126 The results showed that those who participated were 50% less
likely to be arrested and 60% less likely to be thrown back into prison the
first two years after being released. 127 A study conducted in 1997 looked at
prisoners who had participated in Prison Fellowship programs versus those
who hadn't participated in such programs in New York state prisons. 28 The
results indicated that those who were active in Bible studies were
significantly less likely to be rearrested than those who did not., 29 Finally, a
national study conducted at twenty different prisons discovered that
religiosity was positively correlated with self-esteem and with the degree to
which prisoners felt adjusted to prison.' 30  Those prisoners who were
religiously active were also less likely to suffer from depression. 131
It is quite clear that religion can play an important role in furthering
the legitimate goal of prisoner rehabilitation. This is a sentiment shared by
the courts, by Congress, by legal scholars, and by those who work in prisons.
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RLUIPA has encouraged prisoners to exercise their religious beliefs, even if
their requests are at first denied, such as in Madison's case. Furthermore,
prisons should be encouraged to institute religious programs because of the
positive results of such programs. RLUIPA appears to be a statute that will
be here for good and one that will allow prisoners to better themselves
through religion just as any of us can.
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